This paper critically examines attempts to revitalize the comparative political economy model in contrast to analyses based on a globalization perspective. The organized market economy approach of Peter Hall is seen as a more inviting version of the CPE model. The political dilemmas facing national governments in an era of globalization are examined through a discussion of the economic policies of the Blair Government in Britain.
Non-technical summary
Globalization can be hard to define, but that doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. The paper assumes that there is some kind of step change in the world order, although discussing its nature and extent is not the objective of this paper.
What the paper does do is examine critically the stance of the comparative political economy school, as particularly represented by a recent book edited by Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck. This book represents an attempt to revitalise an approach which emphasises the ways in which national differences can help or hinder the international competitiveness of a particular country. Crouch and Streeck are worried that American forms of capitalism will displace German forms of capitalism through the effects of globalization.
Their analysis is in many ways a well argued one, but the whole emphasis is on institutions. One would not think that individual entrepreneurs like Richard Branson had ever achieved anything. Crouch and Streeck seem to take the view that firms compete through the benevolence of their governments.
They also underestimate the importance of new governing entities below and above the level of the nation state. Policies to promote skill formation or nurture high value added activities can often be done most effectively at a subnational level. The European Union is mentioned very little in their analysis and when it is rather negatively -seemingly because it can't replicate the German way of doing things on a European scale. No one denies that there is a paradox at the heart of the EU because it both facilitates globalization and tries to offer social protection from its effects.
Peter Hall's analysis of organized market economies is seen as a more fruitful approach, if only because he recognizes to a greater extent than Crouch and Streeck the weaknesses of organized market economies. They may, he admits, slow down necessary processes of adaptation and change. Even Germany cannot go in the same way, but it may be able to preserve the essential features of its model while making necessary changes.
It is evident that globalization presents national governments with a challenge in managing their economic policies: they have to promise economic success to voters, but can they still deliver? It is argued that the Blair Government in Britain has shown an awareness of the limits of what they can do, but also of the limits of autonomous action. They have been politically astute, although they have to walk a tightrope between fiscal restraint and delivering on promises of better schools and hospitals.
There is a democratic deficit at the global level, but attention should be focussed on this and on new regional and subnational forms of government rather than seeking to shore up the resistance of existing national models to change.
GLOBALIZATION, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE BLAIR GOVERNMENT

Wyn Grant
Globalization and comparative political economy offer different perspectives on the analysis of developments in world political economy. One does not have to accept the extreme pronouncements of writers like Ohmae (1990) to recognise that globalization is a phenomenon which has the potential to reduce the significance and autonomy of the nation state. Globalization is understood in this paper as a continuing process which reduces the significance of national boundaries as an impediment to the free movement of capital, labour, goods and services. Barriers have particularly diminished in the international capital market and remain generally high in relation to labour migration, but the general picture is clear. Indeed, the fact that the definition of globalization is sometimes imprecise is a rather poor argument for dismissing the significance of the phenomenon.
A recurrent theme in both the literature and more popular accounts is that globalization represents nothing new, that at most it is an acceleration of a movement towards greater economic integration and interdependence that has been taking place over a long period of time. Thus, for example, Vandenbroucke argues, 'A cool look at globalisation reveals no significant new and hard economic facts behind the replacement of the traditional expression "the international econoomy" by "the global economy."' (Vandenbroucke, 1998, p.30) . The purpose of this paper is not to argue whether or not globalization represents a paradigm shift in the organization of the world economy rather than, say, an acceleration along an existing path. Nevertheless, the assumption is made that something significant is happening and that, for example, the replacement of GATT by the World Trade Organization does represent a step change in the organization of the international trading regime. However, the focus here is on responses to the perceived phenomenon of globalization, rather than debating whether or not a meaningful change has occurred. Certainly, this paper does not subscribe to a new form of economic determinism which argues that there is only one, liberal path which the world economy can follow.
The comparative political economy approach
The comparative political economy approach emphasises the diversity of environments which nation states provide for their economies.
The term 'approach' is used deliberately as different authors provide a range of models within the general orientation. The underlying argument, however, is that different institutional environments and different national policy paths have a discernible impact on the competitiveness of firms based in a particular nation state. When this literature enjoyed its finest hour in the 1980s, the implicit case being made was that countries with relatively low levels of institutional development would benefit from becoming more like those who had dense institutional networks. Thus, the American 'declinist' literature suggested that the United States should attempt to learn from Japan. At its crudest and most banal, this degenerated into a call for an American 'MITI' (although some would say it already existed in the Department of Defense). Institutions do not easily transfer from one setting to another and it was more consistent with a true 'requisite variety' position to suggest that Americans should try to adhere to their own values and strengths. (Fallows, 1989 ) Some of the other distinctive institutional settings which were discovered by expeditions of social scientists (such as the 'Third Italy') turned out on closer scrutiny to be more complex, flawed and limited than the first dispatches received suggested (Nuti and Cainelli, 1996) and not always well placed to cope with internationalization (Tamisari, 1997) .
In the 1990s, the American economy has been restored to new heights of prosperity and even Britain has not done so badly while Germany has struggled with high unemployment and Japan with financial crisis and the new and unwelcome experience of appreciable levels of unemployment. Faced with the apparent dominance of what they saw as an uncritical neo-liberalism comparative political economists convened at two conferences in France in 1994 under the aegis of the Andrew Shonfield Association. Following on from these conference, the capitalist diversity model is re-visited, re-stated and re-assessed in a recent volume with contributions from some of the leading figures in this field (Crouch and Streeck, 1997) . This paper also offers a discussion of an analysis by Hall which, although in the same comparative political economy family, takes a somewhat different -and, it is argued, more convincing -direction. (Shonfield 1964) . In the past, the present writer has had some walk on parts in the comparative political economy literature (Grant, 1989) . However, with the millennium only two years away, the time has come for a complete change of kit. A new orientation was already presaged in an earlier paper on the stateless firm. (Grant, 1992) .
That is not to say that this paper writes off the nation-state. (Streeck, 1997, p.53) .
The limits of the analysis
This claim that the Rhine model has a better performance record could be the subject of a book by itself, but it cannot go entirely unchallenged. Part of the problem is that any assessment involves value judgements: does one prefer an economy like the United States which creates many jobs, but often at low wages and with considerable overall social inequality; or does one prefer the German approach of high wage jobs, relatively low inequality, but high unemployment (albeit partly the consequence of unification which plays a central role in Streeck's account; Hall also mentions the need to meet EMU convergence criteria).
Britain comes in for particular criticism, and in many ways it is an One hesitates to challenge an analyst and practitioner with such a distinguished record as Graham. However, it is interesting that Crafts is cited in the introduction as an economist sympathetic to institutional perspectives. One hesitates to summarise the rich oeuvre that Crafts has produced on the Thatcher Government. However, in terms of stylised facts his analysis runs as follows: policy mistakes were made, particularly in terms of a failure to act sufficiently quickly on education and training. However, compared to past performance, manufacturing productivity improved, as did overall macroecnomic performance. In part this can be attributed to the removal of the veto power of the unions and the constraints placed on management. (Bean and Crafts, 1996; Crafts, 1997) . In other words, British economic performance may not be good after the marketization of the economy, but it is no worse than it was, and in some respects is better.
One of the difficulties with the analysis presented in the volume is that it is completely focussed on institutional factors. The role of the individual entrepreneur is completely ignored. There is no room for the Richard Bransons or the Alan Sugars of this world. As
Strange points out, 'The success of the economy does indeed depend heavily on quick responses, on adaptability and competitive costs.
But these are attributes of corporate management, not of government officials or politicians.' (Strange, 1997, p.184) . As Porter observes, 'Firms, not nations, compete in international markets.' (Porter, 1990, p.33) . The perspective in this book seems to be that firms and entrepreneurs are allowed to compete through the benevolence of their governments and other social institutions.
Nothing can be created outside the mantle of the state and other social institutions. If Richard Branson had wanted to start a business in Germany, he would have probably have to have obtained a
Handwerk qualification and would then have found that the opening hours of his shops were restricted.
Below and above the nation state
In the world of Crouch and Streeck, 'the politics that was supposed to generate capitalist diversity was national.' (Crouch and Streeck, 1997, p.2) . As a consequence, Strange notes that 'they are still looking within national societies for possible alternatives to government intervention to modify the social consequences of global economic integration.' (Strange, 1997, p.182) . But perhaps Crouch and Streeck are looking in the wrong place for the holy grail of capitalist diversity: perhaps they should be looking above and below the nation state.
We live in a period which seeks to give political expression to subnational identities. Whether the transaction costs of federal or quasi-federal systems are less than the political benefits they bring is a question beyond the scope of this paper. What is not surprising is that one reaction to globalization is to cling even closer to very specific local identities. For example, the rebirth of Scottish identity has come at a time when the Scottish economy is more under international control than ever before.
Scotland has, however, shown an ability to nurture high value added products in specific market niches, e.g., specialist woollen goods or particular branches of food processing. The 'Scottishness' of these goods is often used to market them: note, for example, the advertising campaigns of the food processing firm, Baxters, which uses family members both to stress family ownership and control and the distinctive Scottish character of the products. A Scottish legislature and executive is well placed to nurture such activities.
For example, it can protect and develop the distinctive and in some ways superior Scottish education system thus enhancing human capital formation.
The subnational dimension is largely neglected in the Crouch and Streeck volume, somewhat surprisingly given that in the introduction they state that 'economic governance regimes will vary between subnational regions'. (Crouch and Streeck, 1997, p.16) . The role of banks owned by Land governments in providing funds for small businesses is acknowledged (Pontusson, 1997, p.63 ), but federalism is seen as a constraint that differentiates Germany from Sweden (Pontusson, 1997, p.61) . In Streeck's account, federalism is presented principally as 'an extensive redistributive system of revenue sharing.' (Streeck, 1997, p.38) . Distinctive Land level experiments in high technology policy are ignored.
It is not being suggested that Europe is going to become a patchwork quilt of capitalist diversities nurtured by subnational governments.
However, the subnational dimension does repay some attention. In some ways, the most intriguing possibility is that emergent regional identities which cut across national boundaries will become more important and provided the basis for some kind of publicly sanctioned collective action. (Grant, 1997, p.218) .
The European Union
The single biggest criticism to be made of the Crouch-Streeck analysis is that it downplays the potential significance of the European Union. The European Union is discussed surprisingly little in the book and when it is mentioned, the perspective taken is a rather negative one. Put at its most simplest, the argument of the book's editors is that the quasi-state of the European Union lacks the capacity both to create or protect capitalist diversity or to offer European citizens social protection. They are not claiming that governance institutions are absent in Europe, but that they 'will probably lack the specific "market distorting" capacities of the traditional European nation-state.' (Crouch and Streeck, 1997, p.12) . They are also concerned that 'the failure to establish a European state capacity would seem to be particularly devastating to the social base of the European economies.' (Crouch and Streeck, 1997, p.14) .
Streeck makes it clear that in his view, 'the European quasi-state has no capacity to provide for equalization of living conditions in its territorial subunits.' (Streeck, 1997, p.52) . His view is that
German 'efforts to endow the Internal Market with a "social dimension", in alliance with the French and against the British, came to naught.' (Streeck, 1997, p.51 Nevertheless, the European social space is more than a lowest common denominator and contains elements of 'levelling up' as well as 'levelling down', e.g., legislation on working hours.
There is, of course, a paradox at the heart of the European Union.
On the one hand, it clearly facilitates globalization by removing barriers to capital and trade at a regional level. American multinational companies have been strongly represented politically at the EU level. On the other hand, it seeks to offer protection against globalization by creating a distinctive European social space. The arena in which the EU has done this most successfully is that of agriculture, albeit at a somewhat high price in terms of budgetary expenditure, the cost to consumers and, perhaps most serious of all, the ability of European food products to compete on international markets. The experience of the CAP does at least demonstrate that the EU is able to offer social protection. Indeed, as the competitive pressures from trade liberalization intensify, the EU is asserting even more strongly the distinctiveness of a European agricultural model.
The European project has always been concerned with countering
American hegemony, and as Strange emphasises:
There is a growing asymmetry of regulatory power among the governments of capitalist enterprises. (Hall, 1998) , but also on a contribution to the WZB Jahrbuch (Hall, 1997) . The Baltimore paper is a draft and Hall emphasizes that his answers are 'tentative'. Nevertheless, there are a number of inviting aspects to his approach which merit discussion.
Hall draws a distinction between liberal and organized market economies (following Soskice, the term used in the 1997 piece is 'coordinated market economies'). In comparing these models he recognizes that 'There are some significant differences among nations that might be described as coordinated or liberal market economies; and, within any one of them, some firms will find ways of pursuing corporate strategies that the overall institutional structure does not seem to encourage. ' (Hall, 1997, p.8 (Hall, 1997, p.7) . The organized market economy 'is defined by the extensive degree to which it relies on institutions other than market mechanisms to resolve the coordination problems facing firms.' (Hall, 1998, p.3) . For example, suppliers of finance may be involved in corporate governance, providing sources of finance 'that do not turn on share-price.' (Hall, 1997, p.8) .
Hall recognizes to a greater extent than the Crouch and Streeck authors the weaknesses of an organized market economy approach.
Redeployment of resources in such an economy may take place rather slowly because it involves renegotiation with multiple actors. As a consequence, such economies 'have generally been slow to shift resources across sectors and into new sectors ... in this respect the structural framework of a liberal market economy seems more propitious.' (Hall, 1998, p.16) . One might add that a global economy may have the effect of increasing the pace of change, facing organized market economies with new and difficult dilemmas.
Hall presents an extended discussion of globalization, arguing that it has had particularly strong effects on western Europe. What is a little surprising is his definition of globalization 'as a set of processes that have made it more feasible and desirable for companies to locate at least some of their operations abroad.' (Hall, 1998, p.16 ). This paper has preferred a broader definition of globalization and finds Hall's definition rather restrictive.
Hall's subsequent discussion, although stimulating, has rather different concerns from those of this paper. He does call into question 'the presumption that the business community of each nation will automatically press the state for greater deregulation in order to cope with globalization.' (Hall, 1998, p.19) . While 'pressures for deregulation may come from some quarters, there is likely to be substantial resistance to it from large segments of the business community.' (Hall, 1997, p.11) . Thus, his discussion of Germany leads him to the conclusion that 'fears that Germany will be forced to adopt an Amglo-Saxon economic model are greatly exaggerated.' (Hall, 1997, p.21) .
The subsequent analysis of Britain presented here suggests that it may be the politicians who are the key actors. This is not because they are following any particular set of demands from the business community, but either because their judgement is affected by what they believe to be the siren voices of globalization or, more likely, because globalization offers them an alibi for administering unpleasant medicine in the social sphere which they would wish to use anyway.
There are three points in Hall's analysis which are particularly persuasive. First, there is his acceptance that organized market economies do have some weaknesses and problems. Second, he accepts that some changes must follow in a changed global environment:
'These economies will certainly be called upon to make significant adjustments in their regulatory regimes in the context of the dramatic changes taking place in the international economy.' (Hall, 1998, p.25) . Third, and most intriguingly, he suggests that it would be possible to bring about selective deregulation without setting organized market economies on the slippery slope to full deregulation. In the German case, although 'I have identified several respects in which the institutional structures of the German political economy will come under strain ... there is reason to believe that these structures can accommodate some change without losing any of their distinctive strengths.' (Hall, 1997, p. 21 ).
Streeck would argue that this could be done without unravelling a normative consensus based on income equalization. Hall thinks that some change could be possible without damaging the intricate processes of non-market coordination on which organized market economies depend. He believes that 'these coordination processes may be more robust, in the face of international pressure and some deregulation, than we often suppose.' (Hall, 1998, p.25) . His approach might be characterized as both more optimistic and more realistic than that of Streeck in particular and he offers some interesting arguments which merit further discussion and investigation.
The political dilemma of national governments
According to the Crouch-Streeck model, national governments face some difficult dilemmas in attempting to manage their economic policies. In essence, they still have to promise, but their capacity to deliver has been significanty reduced. 'Hesitant to reveal to their voters the dirty secret that it is no longer they who determine their country's economic policies, national governments must somehow manage to extract from the democratic process policies that conform to the "general will" of global capitalism: the will of "the markets"'. (Crouch and Streeck, 1997, p.11) .
The general argument that will made here is that the Blair Government is handling the political challenge of globalization rather well. It must be emphasized that what is being discussed here is overall strategy rather than particular policy decisions (such as that to rule out membership of EMU for the lifetime of the current Parliament which seems to have driven by political factors rather than economic considerations).
Above all, the Blair Government has shown an awareness of the limits of what they can do, but also of the possibilities for autonomous action. They do perhaps have one advantage over some other national governments in that they do not face 'a potentially destabilizing "democracy illusion" among citizens, to the extent that these continue to expect national politics to offer them protection against market forces.' (Crouch and Streeck, 1997, p.10) . The Blair Government has been handed an economy in which the overwhelming majority of inefficient firms and sectors are no longer in business and in which the public no longer expects, as it did in the 1970s, that government will bail out businesses in trouble. The public does have expectations in relation to social welfare which are of a rather different and potentially more troublesome kind, and this point will be returned to later.
The rather favourable interpretation of the Blair Government presented here is not a partisan one. Partisanship is best saved for the more important activity of football, but in so far as the writer has any political views they are not 'new Labour'. What is being presented here is an analytical perspective which suggests that a successful national economic policy in an era of globalization should have the following features:
1. It should be based on an ideology which embraces the intellectual and political supremacy of market forces.
2. This ideology should be translated into actions which demonstrate a proper respect for market forces.
3. Citizens should nevertheless be offered some protection against the harsher consequences of the market.
The Blair Government meets all three conditions and has been able to wrap up its overall approach to policy in a rhetoric of 'modernisation' which it is very difficult to challenge without appearing to be a defender of all that is archaic in Britain. It has pressed on with constitutional reform which offers the great advantage of being simultaneously modern and inexpensive. It has also been able to weave other images such as 'cool Britannia' which are essentially devoid of any real content. (For a critique of the Blair vision of modernity see Cockett, 1997 ).
This is not to say that the government has no vulnerabilities. It has met some presentational problems and finds it difficult to adjust to the fact that a government is open to much more critical media scrutiny than an opposition. Sometimes the sophistication of its spin doctoring has been self defeating. It also has a strong streak of social authoritarianism which at the moment seems in tune with the electorate but carries with it some risks if it is pushed too far.
These matters have to be mentioned to paint the broader picture, but they are not the focus of this paper. What needs to be discussed here is the way in which the three conditions outlined above have been met by the Blair Government. Before doing this, it should be noted that the government inherited an economy which was recognized by impartial observers as doing well. By 1996 the UK was in the fifth year of an economic recovery based on low inflation and a moderate but steady growth rate. Fifteen years of microeconomic reform had made the UK economy more flexible and competitive and less prone to inflation. (OECD, 1996) .
New Labour adjusts to globalization
Labour's policy adjustments were not necessarily driven by globalization per se. In large part they were a response to domestic imperatives which meant that electoral success was perceived to be dependant on the party's ability to differentiate itself from 'old Labour'.
'New Labour' certainly showed itself able to embrace the philosophy of the market. Blair's analysis starts from the belief that:
The determining context of economic policy is the new global One was that, as a result of globalization, it was essential that domestic governments held to fiscal and monetary prudence.
Second, that there was a role for government, but that was not in extensive economic regulation but in empowerment with the equipment of the individual to make the markets operate better.
Thirdly, that we have to construct a tax and benefit system which was soumd and which helped to make work pay. (Giddens, 1998, p.19) . Second, globalization leads to a softening of borders which revert to being frontiers.
This means 'a nation sure enough of itself to accept the new limits to sovereignty' (Giddens, 1998, p.20) . Third, 'Some of the criticisms offered by the new right about the welfare state are valid.' (Giddens, 1998, p.20) . It needs to be reformed not to cut it back but to make it more responsive to changed circumstances. 
Conclusions: moving the agenda forward
The real disagreement the writer has with some of the comparative political economists is that they acknowledge globalization, but fail to recognise the extent to which regionalisation might be a countervailing power (not to mention diversities protected at the subnational level There is an important agenda to be addressed. National diversities will not disappear, although, as Strange suggests, sectoral diversities may be as important. Unfortunately, some analysts in the comparative political economy school have a predisposition to celebrate the virtues of particular national models, rather than considering how those models might best adjust to a new international setting. One can build on Hall's work to suggest that there is an interesting set of questions about how one can maintain the better features of non-economic coordination arrangements in an era when globalization, broadly conceived, is a major force.
